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1. INTRODUCTION
Financial and capital flows’ liberalization can play a fundamental role in
increasing growth and welfare. Typically, emerging or developing economies
seek foreign savings to solve the inter-temporal savings-investment problem. On
the other hand, current account surplus countries seek opportunities to invest
their savings. To the extent that capital flows from surplus to deficit countries are
well intermediated and, therefore, put to the most productive use, they increase
welfare. Liberalization can, however, also be dangerous, as has been witnessed in
many past and recent financial, currency and banking crises. It can make coun-
tries more vulnerable to exogenous shocks. In particular, if serious macroeco-
nomic imbalances exist in a recipient country, and if the financial sector is weak,
be it in terms of risk management, prudential regulation and supervision, large
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** GEA University, Ljubljana, Sloveniacapital flows can easily lead to serious financial, banking or currency crises. A
number of recent crises, like those in East Asia, Mexico, Russia, Brazil and
Turkey (described, for example, in IMF (2001)), and, to some extent, the
Argentinean episode of late 2001, early 2002, have demonstrated the potential
risks associated with financial and capital flows liberalization.
Central and Eastern Europe has a somewhat different experience, when com-
pared to other emerging regions, concerning the financial liberalization process,
as the process there seems to have been much less crisis-prone than in, for
instance, Asia or Latin America. This maybe, at least partially, because the cur-
rent high degree of external and financial liberalization in the Central Eastern
European countries (CEECs), beyond questions of economic allocative efficien-
cy, must be understood in terms of the process of Accession to the European
Union. The EU integration process implies legally binding, sweeping liberaliza-
tion measures–not only capital account liberalization, but investment by EU
firms in the domestic financial services, and the maintenance of a competitive
domestic environment, giving this financial liberalization process strong external
incentives (and constraints). Those measures were implemented parallel to the
development of a highly sophisticated regulatory and supervisory structure,
again based on EU standards. This whole process happened also with the EU’s
technical and financial support, through specific programs–like the PHARE one,
for these so-called Accession, and the TACIS, for the former Soviet Union ones-
and direct assistance from EU institutions, like the European Commission, the
European Parliament and the European Central Bank (also, on a very early stage
of the transition process, the influence of the IMF in setting up policies and insti-
tutions in several countries in the region–an intervention widely considered to
haven been successful-was important: see Hallerberg et al., 2002).
Additionally, EU membership seems to act as an anchor to market expecta-
tions (see Vinhas de Souza and Hölscher, 2001), limiting the possibilities of self-
fulfilling financial crises and regional contagion (see Linne, 1999), which had the
observed devastating effects in both Asia and Latin America (even a major event,
like the Russian collapse of 1998, had very reduced regional side effects). Several
regional episodes of financial systems’ instability did happen (see Vinhas de
Souza, 2002(a) and Vinhas de Souza, 2002(b)), but none with the prolonged
negative consequences observed in other region (which was also due to the effec-
tive national policy actions undertaken after those episodes). This study’s main
aim is to expand the Kaminsky and Schmukler database (see Kaminsky and
Schmukler, 2003), from now on indicated as K&S, to include the Accession and
Acceding Countries from Eastern Europe (namely, for Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
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Theodore E. Theodoropoulos, Borut Vojinovi~Slovenia). In their original work, K&S build an extensive database of external
and financial liberalization, which includes both developed countries and coun-
tries from emerging regions (but not from Eastern Europe). With that, they cre-
ate different indexes of liberalization (capital account, banking and stock mar-
kets: see Table I below) and using them individually and in an aggregate fashion,
test for the effects and causality of this process on financial and real volatility, for
the existence of differences between regions, and for the effects of the ordering of
the liberalization process.
One underlying hypotheses of this work is that the existing regulatory and
institutional framework in Eastern Europe, plus a more sustainable set of macro
policies, played an important role in enabling liberalization to largely deliver the
welfare enhancing outcomes that it is supposed to. Such an “anchoring” role of
the European Union in the CEECs, through the process of EU membership, and
through the effective imposition of international standards of financial supervi-
sion and regulation, may indicate that, beyond multilateral organizations like the
IMF or the OECD, a greater, pro-active regional stabilizing role in emerging
markets by regional actors, for instance, the United States, or by some regional
sub-grouping, like Mercosur, may also be welfare enhancing for other “emerg-
ing” regions.
Table I: K&S Liberalization Index 
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Economic and Financial Integration in Emerging Markets
Capital Account 
Liberalization  
Financial Sector 
Liberalization  
Stock Market Liberalization  
Criteria for Full 
Liberalization  
-Borrowing abroad by banks 
and corporations  
Banks and corporations are 
allowed to borrow abroad 
mostly freely. They may need 
to inform the authorities, but 
the authorization is granted 
almost automatically. 
Reserve requirements might 
be in place but are lower 
than 10%. The required 
minimum maturity is not 
longer than two years.  
A An nd d  
-Multiple exchange rates and 
other restrictions  
There are no special 
exchange rates for either 
current account or capital 
account transactions. There 
Criteria for Full 
Liberalization  
-Lending and borrowing 
interest rates  
There are no controls 
(ceilings and floors) on 
interest rates.  
A An nd d  
-Other indicators  
There are likely no credit 
controls (subsidies to certain 
sectors or certain credit 
allocations). Deposits in 
foreign currencies are likely 
permitted.  
Criteria for Partial 
Liberalization  
-Lending and borrowing 
interest rates There are 
controls in either lending or 
borrowing rates (ceilings or 
floors).  
Criteria for Full 
Liberalization  
-Acquisition by foreign 
investors  
Foreign investors are allowed 
to hold domestic equity 
without restrictions.  
A An nd d  
-Repatriation of capital, 
dividends, and interest  
Capital, dividends, and 
interest can be repatriated 
freely within two years of the 
initial investment.  
Criteria for Partial 
Liberalization  
-Acquisition by foreign 
investors  
Foreign investors are allowed 
to hold up to 49 % of each 
company's outstanding 
equity. There might be 2. CAPITAL ACCOUNT
The achieving of capital account liberalization happened rather swiftly in
most of the countries in our sample: by the mid 1990s, all bar Bulgaria and
Romania had been declared Article VIII compliant (for those two countries, this
happened in 1998: see Table II below).
E
k
o
n
o
m
s
k
i
 
a
n
a
l
i
 
b
r
 
1
6
4
,
 
j
a
n
u
a
r
 
2
0
0
5
.
 
-
 
m
a
r
t
 
2
0
0
5
.
84
Theodore E. Theodoropoulos, Borut Vojinovi~
are no restrictions to capital 
outflows.  
Criteria for Partial 
Liberalization  
-Borrowing abroad by banks 
and Corporations  
Banks and corporations are 
allowed to borrow abroad, 
subject to certain 
restrictions. Reserve 
requirements might be 
between 10 and 50%. The 
required minimum maturity 
might be between two and 
five years. There might be 
caps in borrowing and 
certain restrictions to specific 
sectors.  
O Or r  
-Multiple exchange rates and 
other restrictions  
There are special exchange 
rates for current account and 
capital account transactions. 
There might be some 
restrictions to capital 
outflows.  
Criteria for No 
Liberalization  
-Borrowing abroad by banks 
and Corporations  
Banks and corporations are 
mostly not allowed to 
borrow abroad. Reserve 
requirements might be 
higher than 50%. The 
required minimum maturity 
might be longer than five 
years. There might be caps in 
borrowing and heavy 
restrictions to certain sectors.  
O Or r  
A An nd d  
-Other indicators.  
There might be controls in 
the allocation of credit 
controls (subsidies to certain 
sectors or certain credit 
allocations). Deposits in 
foreign currencies might not 
be permitted.  
Criteria for No 
Liberalization  
-Lending and borrowing 
interest rates There are 
controls in lending rates and 
borrowing rates (ceilings and 
floors).  
A An nd d  
-Other indicators.  
There are likely controls in 
the allocation of credit 
controls (subsidies to certain 
sectors or certain credit 
allocations). Deposits in 
foreign currencies are likely 
not permitted.  
restrictions to participate in 
certain sectors. There might 
be indirect ways to invest in 
the stock market, like 
through country funds.  
O Or r  
-Repatriation of capital, 
dividends, and interest  
Capital, dividends, and 
interest can be repatriated, 
but typically not before two 
and not after five years of the 
initial investment.  
Criteria for No 
Liberalization  
-Acquisition by foreign 
investors  
Foreign investors are not 
allowed to hold domestic 
equity.  
O Or r  
-Repatriation of capital, 
dividends, and interest  
Capital, dividends, and 
interest can be repatriated, 
but not before five years of 
the initial investment.  II: Capital Account Liberalization
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Economic and Financial Integration in Emerging Markets
Countries   EU Association Agreements: 
Date of entry into force  
Article VIII 
Compatibility  
OECD 
Membership  
Bulgaria   -Europe Agreement: 2/95 
(signed 3/93). A “Europe” 
Trade Agreement also signed 
in 3/93.  
-Application for EU 
membership: 12/95  
-IMF entry: 25/9/90. 
Article VIII: 24/9/98.  
 
Czech Rep.   -Czechoslovakia break-up: 
1/1/93.  
-(New) Europe Agreement: 
2/95 (old one signed in 12/91, 
new in 10/93). A “Europe” 
Trade Agreement since 3/92 
(signed in 12/91).  
-Application for EU 
membership: 1/96.  
-IMF entry: 20/9/90 (as 
the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic, and, 
since 1/93, as separate 
states). Article VIII: 
1/10/95.  
-12/95: OECD 
membership.  
Estonia   -Independence: 20/8/91  
-Europe Agreement: 2/98 
(signed: 6/95).  
-Free Trade Agreement with 
the EU signed in 7/94.  
-Application for EU 
membership: 11/95.  
-IMF entry: 25/5/92. 
Article VIII: 15/8/94.  
 
Hungary   -Europe Agreement: 2/94 
(signed: 12/91). A “Europe” 
Trade Agreement since 3/92 
(also signed in 12/91).  
-Application for EU 
membership: 3/94.  
-IMF entry: 
05/06/1982. Article 
VIII: 1/1/96.  
-5/96: OECD 
Membership.  
Latvia   -Independence: 21/8/91.  
-Europe Agreement: 2/98 
(signed: 6/95).  
-Free Trade Agreement with 
the EU signed in 7/94.  
-Application for EU 
membership: 10/95.  
-IMF entry: 19/5/92. 
Article VIII: 10/6/94.  
 
Lithuania   -Independence: declared in 
11/3/90, only accepted by 
URSS in 6/9/91.  
-Europe Agreement: 2/98 
(signed: 6/95).  
-Free Trade Agreement with 
the EU signed in 7/94.  
-Application for EU 
membership: 12/95  
-IMF entry: 29/4/92. 
Article VIII: 3/5/94.  
 One of the main driving forces behind this was the process of European
Integration, for which external liberalization is a pre-requisite: in the early to
mid-1990s, all the countries had signed Association Agreements with the
European Union (frequently preceded by trade liberalization agreements with
the EU, also called “Europe” trade agreements, usually with years given to the
countries to prepare for their full implementation) and formally applied for EU
membership. Another additional factor supporting liberalization was IMF and
OECD membership: four of the larger countries in our sample became OECD
members during the second half of the 1990s. Another factor to be considered, is
the endogenous decision process to liberalize in a sustainable fashion.
3. BANKING SECTOR 
Financial integration, in the form of the opening up the banking sector to for-
eign banks, is seen as being positive, on a micro level, as foreign banks are usually
better capitalized and more efficient than their domestic counterparts (of course,
the domestic banking sector eventually catches-up: for an indication of this process
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Theodore E. Theodoropoulos, Borut Vojinovi~
Lithuania   -Independence: declared in 
11/3/90, only accepted by 
URSS in 6/9/91.  
-Europe Agreement: 2/98 
(signed: 6/95).  
-Free Trade Agreement with 
the EU signed in 7/94.  
-Application for EU 
membership: 12/95  
-IMF entry: 29/4/92. 
Article VIII: 3/5/94.  
 
Poland   -Europe Agreement: 2/94 
(signed: 12/91). A “Europe” 
Trade Agreement since 3/92 
(also signed in 12/91).  
-Application for EU 
membership: 4/94.  
-IMF entry: 06/12/86. 
Article VIII: 1/6/95.  
-11/96: OECD 
Membership.  
Romania   -Europe Agreement: 2/95 
(signed in 2/93). A “Europe” 
Trade Agreement (also signed 
in 2/93).  
-Application for EU 
membership: 6/95  
-IMF entry: 15/12/72. 
Article VIII: 25/3/1998.  
 
Slovakia   -Czechoslovakia break-up: 
1/1/93.  
-(New) Europe Agreement: 
2/95 (signed: 10/93). A Trade 
Agreement since 3/92 
(signed: 12/91).  
-Application for EU 
-IMF entry: 20/9/90 (as 
the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic, and, 
since 1/93, as separate 
states). Article VIII: 
1/10/95.  
-8/00: OECD 
Membership.  at the ACs, see, among others, Tomova et al., 2003). Also from a macroeconomic
perspective, financial integration maybe positive for the Eastern European coun-
tries, both for long run growth and, as there are indications that foreign banks do
not contract either their credit supply nor their deposit base, in helping to smooth
the cycle (see de Haas and Lelyveld, 2003: they find some indication that this is
linked to the better capitalization base and prudential ratios, as better capitalized
domestic banks behave similarly to foreign banks). Given the bank-centered
nature of virtually all the financial systems of the future Member States, this is par-
ticularly important for them. In most of the member states, the initial stage of the
creation of the two-tier banking system, modeled on the Western European “uni-
versal bank” system, was characterized by rather liberal licensing practices and lim-
ited supervision policies (aimed at the fast creation of a de novo commercial, pri-
vate banking sector: see Fleming et al., 1996, Balyozov, 1999, Enoch et al., 2002,
Sörg et al., 2003). This caused a mushrooming of new banks in those countries in
the early 1990s. Parallel to this, a series of banking crises, of varied proportions,
affected most of those de novo banking systems, due to this lax institutional frame-
work, inherited fragilities from the command economy period (the political need
to support state-owned, inefficient industries, with the consequent accumulation
of bad loans and also the financing of budget deficits), macroeconomic instability,
risky expansion and investment strategies and also sheer inexperience, both from
the investors and from regulators. Progressively, the re-capitalization, privatization
and internationalization of the banking system (mostly into the hands of EU finan-
cial conglomerates), coupled with the implementation of a more robust, EU-mod-
eled institutional framework, did away with most of those problems.
Two of the worst cases where the set of Baltic banking crises and the
Bulgarian episode, which are described in more detail below. Other smaller
banking crises happened in Estonia in 1994 and 1998, and in Latvia in 1994.
Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003, report smaller episodes of “financial sector distress”
in the Czech Republic (94-95), Hungary (93), Poland (91-93), Romania (98-00),
Slovakia (97) and Slovenia (92-94). The initial proliferation of banks was, quite
naturally, followed by a process of consolidation and strengthening–parallel to
the privatization of the remnant state-owned components of the financial sys-
tem–of the banking sector in most of those economies (in Bulgaria, from 81
banks in 1992 to 35 in 2001, in the Czech Republic from 55 in 1995 to 38 in 2001,
Estonia, from 42 in 1992 to 7 currently, while Hungary had 33 banks in 2002,
showing only a very slight decrease from the early 1990s, Latvia from 56 in 1994
to 23, Lithuania from 27 in 1993 to 13, in Poland from 81 in 1995 to 71 in 2001,
in Romania from 45 in 1998 to 41 in 2001, in Slovakia from 22 in 2000 to 19 in
2001, and in Slovenia, where the number fell from 25 to 21 during 2001 alone).
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Economic and Financial Integration in Emerging MarketsThis consolidation process was frequently led by foreign companies, which
now hold the majority of the assets of the banking system in virtually all of
them–contrary to the situation in the current EU Member States–bar Slovenia.
This process now has a component of regional expansion of the Eastern
European banks themselves, or, more precisely in most cases, the regional expan-
sion of Western banks via some of their locally-owned subsidiaries (see Sörg et
al., 2003, ibid). The share of banking assets to GDP, nevertheless, is still far below
the Euro area average (which stood at around 265% of GDP by end 2001), com-
pared with 47% in Bulgaria, 136% in the Czech Republic, 72% in Estonia and
Latvia, 32% in Lithuania, 63% in Poland, 60% in Hungary, 30% in Romania,
96% in Slovakia and 94% in Slovenia (data also for 2001). Another peculiar fea-
ture of the banking system in the region is that foreign currency lending –usually
euro-denominated–to residents is very high, especially in the Baltic republics:
with 80% of total loans in Estonia, 56% in Latvia and 61% in Lithuania. Also, the
Baltic countries have substantial shares of deposits by non-residents, with over
10% in Estonia and Lithuania and close to 5% in Latvia (Latvia, with its close
trading ties to Russia, has a particular strategy of selling itself as a stable financial
services center to CIS depositors: see IMF, 2003(b), ibid). The supervision sys-
tem has also substantially improved, and, following recent international–and
EU- best practice, is now centered in independent universal supervisory agencies
in the most advanced of those countries (Reininger et al., 2002, ibid., estimate
that the formal regulatory environment for the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland is actually above the EU, and that its actual enforcement level is at its
average;
Liive, 2003, gives a description of the Estonian experience that culminated in the
creation of the EFSA –Estonian Financial Supervisory Authority- in January
2002).
3.1 BANKING CRISES IN EASTERN EUROPE
The Baltic bank crises were, to different degrees, linked to liquidity difficul-
ties related tolerations with Russia (in the November 1992 Estonian case, by the
freezing of assets held by some Estonian banks in their former Moscow head-
quarters, while the Latvian and Lithuanian episodes of, respectively, March and
December 1995, were caused by the drying-up of lucrative trade-financing
opportunities with Russia, whose export commodities, at that time, were still
below world price levels) and regulatory tightening (Latvia, Lithuania), com-
pounded by the elimination of credit opportunities with the implementation of
the Estonian and Lithuanian CBAs (Currency Board Arrangements). In
Lithuania, as in Bulgaria, the financing of the budget deficit also played a role. In
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Theodore E. Theodoropoulos, Borut Vojinovi~the Estonian and Latvian cases, around 40% of the assets of the banking system
where compromised, in the Lithuanian and Bulgarian cases, around a third. The
Bulgarian 1996-1997 crisis eliminated a third of its banking sector, and led the
country to hyperinflation (reaching over 2000% in March 1997, see Yotzov,
2002). Its roots lie in the political instability that preceded it (which, on its turn,
led to inadequate real sector reform, with state-owned, loss making enterprises
being financed via the budget deficit or through arrears with the, at the time, still
mostly state-owned part banking sector: those arrears were, in turn, partially
monetized by the Bulgarian National Bank –BNB- and the largest state bank, the
State Savings Bank -SSB). Periodic foreign exchange crises (March 1994,
February 1997) and bank runs (late1995, late 1996, early 1997) were part of this
picture. The implementation of tighter supervisory procedures during 1996 (giv-
ing the BNB the power to close insolvent banks), and a tightening of policy actu-
ally led to more bank runs. A caretaker government in February 1997 (before a
newly elected government took power in May) paved the way to longer lasting
reform and the implementation of the CBA, with its tighter budget constraints
towards both the government and the banking sector. This reform process hap-
pened with the support from multilateral institutionsamely, (namely the IMF).
4. STOCK MARKETS
The existence of stock markets is assumed to be beneficial for economic per-
formance. In principle, it provides a way for companies to raise capital at lower
costs than through simple banking intermediation, and because it is not as
restricted a source of capital as internal financing. Also, it is assumed that the
existence of alternative modes of finance may reduce the likelihood of credit
crunches caused by problems with the banking sector (see Greenspan, 2000).
Additionally, the existence of external ownership is (or was, given the recent
problems with market-based governance in the US and the EU, and the shift
towards a more regulated environment) assumed to provide better governance
for the management of firms. The majority of economic analyses seem to sup-
port the position that a diversified financing mix is positive for economic growth
and stability. As described in the previous section, all the financial sectors in the
Member States are bank-centered, with stock markets playing marginal roles in
most of them (and, in some, a very marginal role: in Bulgaria, Slovakia and
Romania, their average market capitalization in GDP terms is below 5%: see
Figure I below).
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Economic and Financial Integration in Emerging MarketsTable III: Date of (Re-)Creation of Stock Exchanges.
All of these countries had (re-)established stock markets by the mid-90s (see
Table III above). About half of the future Member States used them to drive the
initial process of re-privatization, either via mass issues of voucher certificates for
residents (the most famous case of this strategy was the Czech Republic), or via
IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) re-privatization processes, to lock-in domestic
and foreign strategic investors (see Claessens at al., 2000). In the voucher-driven
privatization, the initial large number of investors and traded stocks in those
stock markets was soon concentrated in a rather limited number of institutional
investors–domestic and foreign- and “blue chip” stocks. In the IPO-driven mar-
kets, the number of stocks and investors actually tended to increase with time,
albeit from a rather concentrated base.
Even in the largest ones, nevertheless, market capitalization, as a GDP share,
was and remains rather low (see Figure I below), and far below the EU average
(around 72% of GDP). Only in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and
Slovenia the average market capitalization is above a 20% GDP share, while in
Romania is below 1% in several years. Also, the average market turnover is
equally below the one observed in comparable EU economies. Similarly to what
is observed in the banking sector, the initial regulatory environment was deliber-
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Theodore E. Theodoropoulos, Borut Vojinovi~
Country   Date of Creation of Stock Exchange  
Bulgaria   -5/92: First Stock Exchange begins trading (up to 20 regional ones 
created); 10/97: The Bulgarian Stock Exchange-Sofia (resulting from 
the consolidation of the previous ones) opened. Stock index available 
from 1/98  
Czech 
Rep.  
4/93: Current Stock Exchange begins trading. Stock index available 
from 5/94  
Estonia   -5/96: Foundation of Tallinn Stock Exchange; 2/02: Merge with 
Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX). Stock index available from 6/96  
Hungary   -6/90: Stock Exchange (re-) established. Stock index available from 2/91  
Latvia   -12/93: Stock Exchange established. 8/02: Finnish HEX acquires Riga 
Stock Exchange and Depositary. Stock index available from 2/96  
Lithuania   -9/93: Stock Exchange trading begins. Stock index available from 1/96  
Poland   -4/91: Warsaw Stock Exchange re-opened. Stock index available from 
5/91  
Romania   -11/95: Stock Exchange begins to operate. Stock index available from 
5/98  
Slovakia   -4/93: Stock Exchange begins trading. Stock index available from 9/93  
Slovenia   -12/89: Stock Exchange established. Stock index available from 1/94  ately lax, and the regulators were plagued by much the same problems of inexpe-
rience and limited number of staff and resources.
Figure I: Equity Market Capitalization as a GDP Share, 1996-2002.
Source: Claessens at al., 2003, modified by the authors.
This does not mean that domestic agents in those countries lack access to the
financial services supposed to be provided by stock markets: the very process of
opening up, the increase in cross-border trade in financial services, the harmo-
nization of rules for capital trading with the EU (including the ongoing efforts of
the Lamfalussy Committee towards a single European market for securities:
according to the current proposal, small and medium size firms would be able to
use a simplified prospectus valid throughout the EU and choose the country of
its approval), plus the development of information technology, all imply that is
not actually necessary–nor economically optimal, given economies of scale–for
each individual country to have its own separate stock market. One must also
recall that the current national stock markets in the mature developed economies
are themselves the result of process of consolidation–and closing-of smaller
regional stock markets (as was observed in Bulgaria in the early 1990s), which
still today coexist with larger, dominant national stock exchanges even in some
mature markets, like Germany and the US. Nevertheless, the observed tendency
of domestic larger companies, with presumed better growth prospects, to list
abroad (see Table IV below), due to the obvious cost and liquidity advantages of
the larger international stock markets, does seems, on balance, to deprive those
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Economic and Financial Integration in Emerging Marketsstock markets of liquidity (see Claessens at al., 2003). On the other hand, non-
residents seem to play a major role in most of those markets (accounting for 77%
of the capitalization in Estonia, 70% in Hungary and half of the free-float capital-
ization in Lithuania).
Table IV: Listed Firms and Cross Listings
Source: Claessens at al., 2003, modified by the authors; *In the “Official Market”, in the
“Free Market” for small caps, another 372 (in 2001); ΡIt is estimated that only 15 shares
are actively traded; §In the “Official Market” only six companies are listed; ΝDue to legal
reasons, major foreign-owned banks are forced to list on the Warsaw Stock Exchange:
they are believed to be responsible for a full third of the market capitalization, while 90%
of the “free float” is done by just 20 stocks.
All the specific questions described above concerning the way those stock
exchanges were founded and their later developments, plus their relative small-
ness and shallowness, affect the dynamics of their stock market indexes (SMI),
and are clearly reflected by them (as one may see in Figure II, below). This, cou-
pled with the rather limited duration of the series, may affect their adequacy as
proxies of financial cycles.
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Market 
capitalization of 
Internationally 
Listed firms/Total 
Market 
Capitalization  
(%)  
Value 
Traded 
Abroad/Valu
e Traded 
Domestically  
Number of 
Cross 
Listed 
Firms  
Share of 
Cross Listed 
Firms  
Total Number 
of Listed 
Issuers  
Bulgaria   N.A   N.A   N.A   N.A  
30*  
Czech 
Republic   98.90   11.8 40   36   111Ñ    
Estonia   95.30   84.7 8   44.4   18    
Hungary   99.80   14.6 52   74.3   70    
Latvia   0.30   0.6 2   12.5   16    
Lithuania   42.40   337.3 5   11.4   44§    
Poland   81.30   62.5 30   12.2   246Í     
Romania   N.A   N.A   N.A   N.A  
63  
Slovakia   76.20   N.A 6   23.1   26    
Slovenia   7.00   5.9 2   1   189    
Average   62.60   73.9   14.5   26.9   81.3  Figure II: Stock Market Indexes
Source: Datastream, modified by the authors. The price indexes here were converted to
US Dollars and re-based to a common reference period were they equal 100, May of
1998. The country codings are as described in the Annexes.
5. ESTIMATED INDEXES
The construction of the index for this new sample of countries was the core
of this work. A comprehensive effort was done to crosscheck the information
collected from papers and publications with national sources. Below we present
the estimated monthly index, for the period January 1990 to June 2003 (see
Figure III). The base data for its construction was collected from IMF and EBRD
publications, and then exhaustively verified both with national sources and with
works written about the individual countries and the region. This is an index that
falls with liberalization, where maximum liberalization equals one and mini-
mum three (in this sense, one could actually see it as an index of financial repres-
sion). As an additional robustness check, the year-end value of the index here
constructed was regressed on the combined EBRD’s yearly indexes of banking
sector reform and non-banking financial sector reform. The results from a panel
regression with the index constructed here on the LHS and the EBRD index on
the RHS yield a coefficient of .60, and correlations among the individual coun-
try-specific index series range from -0.91 to –0.35.
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Economic and Financial Integration in Emerging MarketsFigure III: Average Full Liberalization Index. 
As one may see from Figure III above, the process of integration and liberal-
ization was almost continuous throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The spikes
in the “Full Liberalization Index” in the early 1990s do not indicate reversals: the
merely reflect the entry into the sample of the newly independent Baltic
republics. As former members of the Soviet Union, they “enter” the world as
highly closed economies, but those countries introduced liberalization reforms
almost immediately from the start. After this, a slight increasing trend, that does
reflect a mild liberalization reversal, is observed, starting mid-1994 and lasting
until early 1997, from when a continuous liberalization trend is observed.
Noteworthy here is the fact that virtually none of the obvious candidates for
a reversal of liberalization (the 1997 Asian Crisis, the collapse of the Czech mon-
etary arrangement in 1997, the collapse of the Bulgarian monetary arrangement
in 1996/97, the 1998 Russian Crisis, the 1999-2001 oil price shocks–as all those
economies are highly dependent of imported energy sources) seems to have dri-
ven these mild liberalization reversals. Comparing the Full Index constructed
here with the one constructed by K&S, for similar time samples, one may observe
that the ACs start substantially below the average level of other emerging mar-
kets–i.e., they are more liberalized, but both the “entry” of the initially less liber-
alized former Soviet republics, plus continuous liberalization efforts in the
emerging market K&S set reverse this situation. A similar liberalization reversal
trend in both the ACs and the merging market set is observed from early 1994,
but it is actually slightly stronger on the ACs sample, until its reversal in 1996. By
the end of our sample, the ACs are clearly below the final value for the emerging
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Theodore E. Theodoropoulos, Borut Vojinovi~set in K&S’s sample. This sort of remarkably fast pattern of the ACs’ “leap-
froging” towards best international practice is also observed in several types of
institutional frameworks, like, for instance, monetary policy institutions and
instruments (see Vinhas de Souza and Hölscher, 2001): a process that virtually
took decades for Western central banks was compressed in a half a dozen years in
the Future Member States. Nevertheless, by the end of the sample, both emerg-
ing and ACs are still above the level of mature, developed economies.
Figure IV: Comparing the Liberalization Indexes 
Analyzing the individual components of the index (see Figure V), one may
see that, abstracting again from the initial spikes in the index, which are, as
explained above, caused by the addition of new countries to the sample, the
1994/1997 reversal of liberalization was essentially driven by the Financial Sector
liberalization component. As will become clear with the country specific analysis
below, this was related, in most cases, to–and here it must be stressed that those
were rather limited reversals-to the banking crises that plagued several countries
in our sample in the early to mid 1990s.
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Economic and Financial Integration in Emerging MarketsFigure V: Individual Components of the Liberalization Index
Comparing now the individual components of the Full Index constructed
here with the ones from K&S, again for emerging and mature economies, it
becomes clear that the reversals observed in Figure IV were driven by different
sources in the emerging set (increase in capital account restrictions) and ACs set
(financial sector): see Figure VI. All the indexes for mature economies are, again
as one would expect, substantially lower.
Figure VI: Comparing Individual Components of the Liberalization Indexes
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Theodore E. Theodoropoulos, Borut Vojinovi~One could, in principle, aggregate the countries in our sample in three differ-
ent groups: rapid liberalizers (the ones that followed a “big bang” early approach,
without major reversals: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), consistent liberal-
izers (the ones that followed a more delayed path, but also without major roll
backs: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) and cautious liberalizers (the ones
whose liberalization path was either openly inconsistent or downright mistrust-
ful: Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia).
Table V: Values of the Full Index by Country
5.1 COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY LIBERALIZATION PATH.
In Bulgaria, virtually no sign of a liberalization reversal is observed, even dur-
ing the substantial stress experienced by the country during the banks runs of
1996/97 and the ultimate collapse of the floating regime in 1997 (beyond ad hoc
restrictive measures adopted by the banks themselves). As in most of the coun-
tries in my sample, the stock market is the last one to liberalize, but does so in a
faster fashion. Nevertheless, this is in most cases a data quasi-artifact that arises
from the later (re-)constitution of the stock exchange itself. In the Czech
Republic, a limited reversal of the financial sector liberalization is observed from
late1995 to late 1997, namely, via the imposition of limits on banks’ short-term
open positions towards on-residents, as a way to limit the exposure of the finan-
cial sector to the inflows brought about by the hard peg and the potential gains
with interest rate differentials. After the peg was replaced by the current float
regime, this restriction is duly removed. In Estonia, again, virtually no sign of a
liberalization reversal is observed, even during the bank runs of the early 1990s,
the unwinding of the 1997 bubble, nor during the 1998 Russian crisis. Again, the
stock market is the last one to liberalize, but one more time, this arises from the
later constitution of the stock exchange. In Hungary, also no signs of any liberal-
ization reversal are observed. Hungary was an early reformer, introducing some
liberalization measures already during the late 1980s, but the profile of its reform
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  Bulgaria  Czech 
Rep.  
Estonia   Hungary Latvia   Lithuania  Poland   Romania   Slovakia  Slovenia  
Average 
Index  
1.17   1.21   1.53   1.81   1.21   1.35   1.68   2.05   1.93   1.92  
Initial 
Value of 
Index  
2.37   1.30   3.00   2.47   3.00   3.00   2.30   2.83   2.40   2.13  
Final 
Value of 
Index  
1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.20   1.53   1.60   1.30   1.07  
 path is much more discounted through time, as compared, for instance, with the
Baltic countries. In Latvia, a rather limited reversal of the financial sector liberal-
ization is observed from mid 1996all the way to early 2003: resulting from the
1996 banking crisis, specific aggregate lending limits to regions (i.e., limits on
exposure to non-OECD countries, bar the other Baltic republics) are imposed. In
Lithuania, a limited reversal of the financial sector liberalization is observed from
early 1998, also resulting from the experienced banking crisis: reserve require-
ments on deposits on foreign accounts by non-resident are introduced; In
Poland, no signs of any liberalization reversal are observed. Similarly to
Hungary, the profile of its reform path is much more discounted through time;
In Romania, no signs of any liberalization reversal are observed, but the reform
path is a decidedly slow and cautious one: at the end of the sample, it has the
highest (i.e., less liberalized) score for the “Full Index” of all countries in the
sample: 1.60 (see Table V). In Slovakia, no signs of any liberalization reversal are
observed. Here, the reform path is characterized by a broad stagnation since the
Czechoslovak partition till 1998/1999, when, after a change in the political lead-
ership, reforms are re-started, reaching after that levels similar to the other “Vise
grad” countries in a rather quick fashion. In Slovenia, one of the most consis-
tently cautious Member States concerning the advantages of integration and lib-
eralization, reversals are indeed observed in all three indexes, since early 1995in
the capital account and financial sector components, and from early 1997 in the
stock market one. Since early 1999, with the entry in effect of the EU Association
Agreement, across-the-board further (re)liberalization measures have been
introduced.
6. FINANCIAL CYCLES AND LIBERALIZATION 
The financial cycle coding which is used by K&S defines cycles as a at least
twelve month-long strictly downwards (upwards) movement, followed by a
equally upwards (downwards) 12-month movement from the through (peak) of
a stock market index, measured in USD, as they should reflect returns from the
point of view of an international investor. As described in the stock market sec-
tion of this work, one must be warned that there are specific factors in the coun-
tries in our sample that may affect the effectiveness of a stock market index as an
adequate proxy of financial cycles, at least for the sample here considered.
Beyond that, these series have a rather limited time extension (our sample covers
the 01:1990-06:2003 period). Adapting K&S criteria to the limited time dimen-
sion of our sample, we use a less stringent definition of “cycle”, the same algo-
rithm as above but with a 3-month window for the cycle (Edwards et al., 2003,
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Theodore E. Theodoropoulos, Borut Vojinovi~use a 6-month window). With this we get 118 observations for all countries in
our sample. Of these 118 cycles, 61 are upward, with an average of 7.51 months
duration, and 57 are downward, with an average of 8.20 months of duration.
7. CONCLUSION
The main aim of this paper was to extend the index developed by Kaminsky
and Schmukler, 2003, for a specific sample of countries, namely, the previously
centrally planned economies from Central and Eastern Europe, and to perform a
similar analysis on them. Our results do lend some support to the basic assump-
tion of this study: in spite of all the limitations of the time series used (their
shortness, the fact that they were buffeted by several country-specific and com-
mon shocks), a re-estimation of K&S’s core regressions strongly supports the
notion that financial liberalization does generate benefits both in the short and in
the long run, measured via the extension of the amplitude of upward cycles and
its reduction for downward cycles of stock market indexes. Importantly, these
results diverge from K&S, as in their work “emerging markets” experience a rela-
tive short run increase in the amplitude of downward cycles. Another notewor-
thy feature is that only minor liberalization reversals, led by the financial sector
component, were observed in the aggregate index. Also, those reversals do not
seem to be driven by “contagion” from shocks in other emerging markets (like
the Asian or Russian crisis), but reflect country-specific shocks. When consider-
ing the individual components of the index separately, again signs of minor
reversals in financial sector liberalization are observed, related to temporary
reactions to the several banking crisis observed in the region. Concerning the
importance of institutions and of the EU Accession, this paper’s initial assump-
tion was that the mostly positive results above would come about due to the
anchoring of expectation provided by the perspective of entry into the EU
already by mid-2004 (or 2007, in the case of Bulgaria and Romania) for the
countries here analyzed, and by the imposition of a more robust macro and insti-
tutional framework by the requirements of the Accession process itself. Signs of
this are not found in the K&S regressions, perhaps because the liberalization
index itself captures the effects of the EU Accession process.
Finally, using a different framework than K&S’s to assess the affects of liberal-
ization on financial, real and nominal volatility, most of the econometric results
seem to support the previous ones, but they seem to indicate that the capital
account liberalization is the element that most consistently and significantly reduces
volatility. On this final section, the majority the econometric results seem to support
some specific role for the EU Enlargement process in reducing volatility.
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